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including © notice, is given to the source. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being ev-
idently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and
the small States, does not call for much discussion. (Madison 1788)
1 Introduction
T h eU Sc o n s t i t u t i o nm a n d a t e sad i ﬀerent type of representation for the federal States in the
two branches of Congress. Members of the House are assigned proportionally to population
and regularly reapportioned in response to demographic changes. In the Senate, the principle
of equal representation prescribes that each state must be represented by two senators. In the
intent of the founding fathers of the US constitution, the double representation principle should
balance the interests of the small and big states. The combination of proportional and equal
representation, together with the House proposal power on budgetary matters, should grant
adequate consideration to the interests of all states, independently of their population size.1
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) provide a formal model showing how the attribution of proposal
power to the lower house may indeed counterbalance the malapportionment in the upper house
leading to an equal distribution of per capita government expenditure.
Despite the proclaimed virtues of the double representation system, the current empirical
literature provides large support for the existence of a “small state advantage” in the allocation
of the US federal budget. In particular, the pioneering and very inﬂuential work of Atlas et al.
(1995) (henceforth AGHZ), analyzing biennial data between 1972 and 1990, ﬁnds a strongly
positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between per capita representation in the US
House and Senate and per capita federal spending. They introduce in the empirical literature
a measure of state over-representation (the number of representatives per capita) which has
become very common and has inspired a number of subsequent works. Their procedure amounts
to estimating the following equation:
FEDEXP st = γ ∗ SPst + δ ∗ HPst + θZst + αs + βt + ²st,
s =1 ,...S; t =1 ,...,T; (1)
where FEDEXP st is real per capita federal expenditure (outlays) in state s at time t, SPst
1In relation to the risk of overrepresentation of the small states, Madison writes: “The large States, therefore,
who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing to do but to make reapportionments and
augmentations mutually conditions of each other; (...). The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but
they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse
(...)” (Madison 1788).
2stands for senators per capita, HPst for house members per capita, Zst is a vector of socioeco-
nomic control variables, and αs and βt represent respectively the state and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Estimating equation (1), AGHZ ﬁnd a positive impact of per capita representation on spending
in both the Senate and the House. The seminal AGHZ contribution has prompted a number of
similar studies that have substantially conﬁrmed the correlation between federal spending and
per capita Senate representation.2 The eﬀect of the House has instead not been found again in
the literature.
In this paper we argue that the methodology proposed by AGHZ is aﬀected by fundamental
ﬂaws that make its results unreliable and misleading. Equation (1) cannot identify the impact
of over-representation on spending because it relies exclusively on population variations (both
across and within states) which can aﬀect spending for several other plausible reasons besides
over-representation. Hence, the eﬀect of malapportionment, in particular in large spending
aggregates, remains not identiﬁable using the number of senators per capita as a measure of
over-representation.3 Moreover, since other factors may be responsible for an inverse rela-
tionship between spending and population, the use of this measure alone can lead to a gross
overestimation of the eﬀect of over-representation on spending.
According to the estimates of AGHZ, the diﬀerence in total real per capita spending due
to over-representation between the most overrepresented (Wyoming) and the most under-
represented (California) states amounts in 1990 to 1148$ (current dollars) per capita, which is
equivalent to approximately one third of the total spending of Wyoming in that year. They
estimate that California would gain an additional $25 billion of federal spending if their num-
ber of senators were proportional to the state population size. The estimated coeﬃcients of
senators per capita from other empirical studies point to similar magnitudes (Wright (1974);
Wallis (1998); Larcinese et al. (2006)). Is small Wyoming really so much more powerful than
California as current empirical investigations seem to suggest? If this is the case, should the
2Lee (1998), using Bickers and Stein (1991) data on domestic outlays from 1983 to 1990, ﬁnds evidence
of overspending in small states for non-discretionary distributive programmes that are allocated via formulas
determined by the Congress. Hoover and Pecorino (2005), considering a diﬀerent time period (1983-1999)
and a broad range of spending aggregates, ﬁnd that states’ representation in the Senate is positively related
with total per capita outlays as well as with procurement, grants, wages and pensions. They, however, ﬁnd
a negative impact of House representation. Finally, Knight (2004) does not ﬁn das t r o n ge ﬀect for Senate
overrepresentation on aggregate spending, although he does on earmarked projects: the eﬀect is particularly
strong if the earmark comes from the Senate. Hauk and Wacziag (2007), using the authorizations from the
2005 Highway Bill, conﬁrm the existence of an overrepresentation eﬀect on transportation earmarks. At district
level, Ansolabehere et al. (2002) analyze the eﬀect of unequal representation prior to 1960 and the equalizing
impact on state transfers to counties following the court-ordered redistricting in the 1960s.
3Studies that use very speciﬁc spending aggregates (Knight (2004), Hauk and Wacziag (2007)) or exploit
exogenous variations in representation (Ansolabehere et al. (2002)) are less likely to be aﬀected by the same
identiﬁcation problems.
3equal representation principle within the Senate be addressed as a serious ﬂaw of the US con-
stitution?4
We provide new evidence that questions the relevance of malapportionment in the US bud-
get allocation process. We show that, while state population has undoubtedly a large negative
eﬀect on total per capita spending, only a fraction of this eﬀect, if any at all, is actually due
to over-representation. Instead, what the current literature interprets as the eﬀect of malap-
portionment is in large part due to state speciﬁc trends associated with population dynamics.
This conclusion is driven by two main ﬁndings. First, the coeﬃcient of senators per capita
becomes completely insigniﬁcant if we appropriately control for state speciﬁc trends and state
speciﬁc population dynamics. Second, fast growing states are penalized in the allocation of the
federal pie independently of whether they are large or small. This last result is particularly
intriguing and provides support towards the concerns voiced by several representatives of fast
growing states complaining about the unfair treatment of their states in the allocation of the
federal budget.5 In fact, according to our estimates, the budgetary loss for fast growing states
is sizable. For example, the seven fastest growing states lost on average between 3% and 18%
of their budget during the period 1978-2002.
The factors that can be responsible for this important distortion are numerous and can be
traced back to the way the budget allocations are actually determined. First, reallocations of
funds are limited by the lack of information available for the drafting of the yearly budget.6
For example, several programs rely on outdated census data to distribute funds across states.7
Second, for formula programs, the responsiveness of the budget to population changes is often
substantially reduced by speciﬁc rules, such as for example “hold harmless provisions” (which
guarantee ﬁxed shares of past allocations) and upper and lower bound limits to speciﬁcf o r m u l a
components. Third, for programs with an entitlement nature, the response of yearly budget al-
location to population dynamics is also aﬀected by its demographic components. For any given
increase in population, entitlement spending per capita decreases in States where the popula-
tion growth is concentrated among social groups not qualifying for entitlements and viceversa.
4For a critical view on Senate representation in the US constitution see Dahl (2002).
5Several pieces of legislation introduced in Congress between 1989 and 1993 by the representatives of Florida,
Arizona and California point out that the budget allocation based on decennial census data penalizes fast growing
states. (Fair share act of 1989, 1992 and 1993. source: The library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/)
6As posited by a voluminous literature of behavioral “incrementalist” theories of budgeting originated with
Wildavsky (1964), the limited temporal, ﬁnancial and cognitive resources available in each year do not allow a
rigorous re-examination of the current budget which is then determined by marginal changes to past budgetary
allocations.
7For an oﬃcial report see “Federal Formula Programs: outdated population data used to allocate most
funds” (GAO 1990).
4Focusing on speciﬁcs p e n d i n ga g g r e g a t e sw eﬁnd evidence consistent with these mechanisms of
budgetary inertia. In particular, fast growing states are penalized in the allocation of federal
grants, in which formulas play a primary role, as well as in the distribution of direct payments
to individuals, which consist mainly of entitlements.8 We ﬁnd instead some evidence of a small
state advantage in defense spending, although of a rather small size.
Our analysis reveals that a substantial degree of inertia reins in the allocation of the budget
implying that the growth (decrease) in population is typically not compensated by a propor-
tional increment (decrease) in federal spending, thus determining a decrease in spending per
capita in states with a fast-growing population, and an increase in states where the population
decreases or grows slowly. Therefore, the procedures that make public spending not suﬃciently
responsive to population changes are responsible for a large part of the distortions that are
currently interpreted as a consequence of malapportionment.
2 Over-representation and federal spending: identiﬁca-
tion problems
Population size varies considerably across US states and so does per capita Senate representa-
tion. Table 1 reports an index of average Senate and House over-representation by state during
the period 1978-2002.9 Under or over-representation is determined by comparison with a fair
representation given by the ratio between the total members of the House (or Senate) and the
t o t a lU Sp o p u l a t i o ni nag i v e ny e a r . 10 States are ordered by average population in the period
1978-2002 (starting with the smallest) and obviously smaller states are overrepresented in the
Senate. In the House, however, this phenomenon is negligible and not correlated with the
population size of a state. Table 1 also reports average federal spending per capita by state in
the period considered, showing that there is no clear pattern linking Senate over-representation
and spending. This can be seen graphically in Figure 1, where the states are ordered along
the horizontal axis according to their average population in the period considered, while on the
vertical axis we report average per capita outlays.
8This last ﬁnding provides a plausible explanation for the inverse relationship between population and direct
payments to individuals, solving one of the most striking puzzles associated with the AGHZ speciﬁcation, which
predicts a large and signiﬁcant impact of overrepresentation on this hardly targetable spending item.
9Like most of literature on the allocation of US federal spending, we focus on the 48 contiguous states.
10More speciﬁcally, deﬁne Nst as the population of state s in year t and USpopt as the total US population





48∗Nst , while for the House is hmst
Nst / 432
USpopst, where hmst is the number of House representatives
of state s in year t and 432 is the total number of representatives when Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.
5In the following we will focus on the Senate.11 First of all, we estimate the eﬀect of over-
representation on spending following the AGHZ methodology and using Census data on total
real per capita spending (outlays) for the US States during the period 1978-2002.12 The results
a r er e p o r t e di nc o l u m n1o fT a b l e3 .S i m i l a r l yt oA G H Z ,w eﬁnd that the impact of senators
per capita on federal spending is large and statistically signiﬁcant.13 The implied magnitudes
are also relatively similar to what has been found by AGHZ and the subsequent literature.
Given the magnitude of these eﬀects, it is legitimate at this point to ask what exactly is
being estimated with this procedure. Since the number of Senators is ﬁxed and equal to 2 for
all states, the variable SP in equation 1 is simply a constant divided by the population. In
other words, SP varies over time for a given state only because population varies. Therefore,
interpreting the coeﬃcient of SP as the impact of malapportionment is not an obvious step.
In fact, changes in population can aﬀect spending per capita for many reasons, and a negative
coeﬃcient of senators per capita only tells us that there is an inverse relationship between
federal spending and population. How much of this inverse relationship (if any) is due to
malapportionment remains moot.
To get a better understanding of how we should interpret this negative relationship, it be-
comes then important to clarify how spending per capita and population are related. Changes
in the population of the states imply changes in their per capita federal budget allocations via
two main channels. First, states may receive diﬀerent amounts of spending because they diﬀer
in their population sizes (scale eﬀect). Second, independently of their size, their spending allo-
cation can vary because of pure population dynamics (change eﬀect). Diﬀerences in spending
per capita due to the scale eﬀect may arise because states are diﬀerently represented in the
Senate (as claimed by AGHZ), but also as a consequence of economies of scale in the provision
of goods and services ﬁnanced by the federal spending. In addition to these two diﬀerent scale
eﬀects, an inverse relationship between spending per capita and population can also be observed
- independently of the size of the states - whenever yearly changes in per capita spending do not
11All our estimates have also been replicated by including House representatives per capita. Consistently with
other studies, the coeﬃcient of House representatives per capita is sometimes positive, more often negative, and
never statistically signiﬁcant at any acceptable level. The rather peculiar result of AGHZ concerning the House
representation remains puzzling and should probably only be considered a sampling accident. The results on
Senate overrepresentation remain unaﬀected by the introduction of House representatives per capita.
12The summary statistics for population, senators and house members percapita and real federal outlays by
spending categories are reported in Table 2.
13The signiﬁcance of SP, however, disappears if the ﬁxed eﬀects are removed, consistently with Knight (2004)
who also ﬁnds a very modest impact of overrepresentation in cross-section regressions. The same result can be
obtained from yearly cross-section regressions and when using the between estimator. These estimates are not
reported but are available from the authors upon request.
6exactly reﬂect yearly changes in population. In this case, fast growing states, independently of
their size, could see a decline of per capita spending because budgetary provisions do not ade-
quately respond to population trends. Hence, when we observe an inverse relationship between
spending and population it is diﬃcult to understand whether this is due to scale eﬀects, such
as over-representation and economies of scale, or to pure population dynamics irrespective of
the size of the states.14
Having clariﬁed that the coeﬃcient of senators per capita cannot be interpreted (or not
entirely, at least) as the eﬀect of malapportionment, in the next section we try to disentangle
the diﬀerent role played by scale and change eﬀects on spending.
3 Population dynamics and state-speciﬁct r e n d si nf e d -
eral spending
Many factors contribute to generate inertia in the allocation of the federal budget. First, as
pointed out by incrementalist theories (Wildavsky (1964) ; Davis et al. (1966); Dempster and
Wildavsky (1979)), the complexity of the budget implies that new provisions are determined
mainly by marginal changes to previous ones. Second, formulas play an important role in
explaining budgetary inertia. For several programs, hold-harmless provisions guarantee to the
states a given share of past spending irrespective of any variation in their circumstances.15
Similarly, upper and lower limits in speciﬁc formula inputs constrain the outcome that would
be generated by the basic formula.16 Finally, the use of outdated population data in formulas
penalizes states whose population grows fast.17
14Another important point in this regard is whether, besides senators percapita, population should also be
included in the regressions. The estimated equation would then become FEDEXPst = γ ∗SPst +φ∗POPst +
θZst + αs + βt + ²st, where POPst stands for population in state s year t. Including a linear population term





, while, without it, the same derivative would be −
2γ
POP2. Hence,
including a linear population term along with senators percapita amounts merely to choosing a slightly diﬀerent
functional form, whereby the hyperbolic eﬀect of population through SP is translated by a linear term. However,
and more importantly, the fundamental identiﬁcation problem remains unaﬀected by whether or not a linear
population term is included. Not surprisingly, therefore, our estimate of the coeﬃcient of senators per capita is
not aﬀected by whether a linear population term is included or not.
15For example, a 100% hold harmless provision is currently in place for the Title I education program and
the WIC (Women, Infant and Children). For a detailed report on formula programs see CNSTAT (2003).
16For example, the Title I education program state expenditure per pupil is restricted to a range between
80% and 120% of the national average per pupil expenditure. In the special education program no children
may receive more than 40% of the average per pupil expenditure in US public elementary and secondary school.
Other important programs subject to limits are the Federal Highway Program and Medicaid.
17In a recent testimony (26 february, 2008) to Congress concerning State Children’s Health Insurance program
(SCHIP), the governor of Georgia Sonny Perdue states that “The current funding formula is also ﬂawed because
it hurts fast growing states, like Georgia, by lagging behind by as much as four years in factoring in quickly
7The budgetary inertia introduced by these mechanisms can have important consequences
since the US states are remarkably diﬀerent in terms of population dynamics. During the period
we consider (1978-2002), for example, the population of Nevada increased by three times, that
of Florida and Arizona by two. At the same time, in states like West Virginia, North Dakota,
Iowa or Pennsylvania the population in 2002 is either slightly below or just slightly above the
level of 1978.
To describe the population dynamics of the states independently of their size, we construct
a scale independent index of population change dividing the population of every year by the
population of a given base year (1978). Hence, in 1978 the index (POPIND)i se q u a lt o
100 for all states, and in all the other years the index will measure the deviation of the state
population from the same base year. The pattern for all states during the entire period is
summarized in Figure 2, where we report the index for our 48 US states during the period
1978-2002. As we can see, states display very distinct patterns. Moreover, large, medium or
small states can be equally found among the fastest growing as well as the slowest growing
states. For example, among the three fastest growing states, we have Nevada with an average
population of 1.2 million during the period 1978-2002, Arizona with 3.7 million and Florida
with 12.7 million. Similarly, among slow-growing states we have New York with an average
population of 18 million, as well as Connecticut with 3.2 million and North Dakota with 0.6
million.
Our next step is to analyze the evolution of spending per capita over time and understand
how it is related to population dynamics. In Table 4 we show the estimated state trends for
federal outlays per capita during the period 1978-2002. In most states the trend is positive and
signiﬁcant at 5% or 1% levels. In four states only (Connecticut, Washington, New Hampshire,
and Utah) the estimated trend is not signiﬁcant. For states where a positive trend is observed,
the implied growth rate of federal outlays varies considerably, with estimated coeﬃcient values
in the range 0.0065-0.08. This leads us to formulate the hypothesis that a state-trend variable
is missing in equation (1). Also, the correlation coeﬃcient between senators per capita and
the trend variable is almost always bigger than 0.95, which means that omitting state speciﬁc
trends from equation (1) can introduce a bias in the estimated coeﬃcient of senators per capita.
A closer inspection of spending per capita in diﬀerent states reveals that spending trends
are also highly related to the diﬀerent population dynamics. A simple graphical analysis can
changing population numbers. In our 2007 ﬁscal year, the federal government was using population numbers
from 2004, 2003 and as far back as 2002. Georgia has grown by almost a million peoples since 2002. We need
data that is reﬂective of the actual population and need.” (source: http:\gov.georgia.gov accessed on April 20
2008).
8illustrate the relationship between spending per capita and state population quite eﬀectively.
We construct two indices that capture for each state the evolution over time of their respective
spending and population shares (of the US total).18 An increase in an index above 100 means
that the state has a higher share of the US total compared to its 1978 share. The evolution
of these two indices over time, reported in Figures 3a and 3b, shows a remarkable degree of
divergence: an above average increase in population is almost always mirrored by a below
average increase in federal spending per capita. For example, California and Texas are two
under-represented states with fast growing population and correspondingly decreasing federal
spending per capita. Pennsylvania and Ohio are also heavily under-represented, but with a
decreasing population: they display an increase in the federal spending index, i.e. an above
average growth in spending per capita. Similar patterns can be seen among over-represented
states. In Wyoming the population is growing fast until the mid-eighties and its share of
spending per capita is decreasing correspondingly. Once, however, the population decelerates
its growth compared to national average, its share of spending per capita starts increasing. Utah
has an increasing population share and a decreasing spending share, whereas the opposite holds
in West Virginia. In Nevada - an over-represented state with the fastest growing population in
the US - the spending index is always below its 1978 level and continously decreasing.
From this preliminary analysis we can conclude, ﬁr s to fa l l ,t h a ts p e n d i n gp e rc a p i t ai s
characterized by state-speciﬁc trends correlated with the number of senators per capita and,
second, that the pattern of spending per capita is inversely correlated with scale independent
population dynamics. Therefore, to obtain a better estimate of the scale eﬀect (which is a
proxy of over-representation) we need to remove the pure change eﬀect of population dynamics
from the estimated coeﬃcient of senators per capita.
A ﬁrst strategy consists of introducing state speciﬁc trends, ts,i no u rb a s i cs p e c i ﬁcation19
and, therefore, estimate the following equation:
FEDEXPst = γSPst + θZst + αs + ts + βt + ²st,
s =1 ,...S; t =1 ,...,T; (2)
18For spending we construct a size invariant index by dividing the state per capita spending in each year by
its value in 1978. We also construct an analogous index for the overall spending in the United States. The
ratio between the state spending index and its corresponding US index will then describe the relative change of
spending in a state compared to the US average. We then construct an analogous index for the population of
each state by dividing our previously computed scale independent index of population by its corresponding US
index.
19We would like to thank an anounymous referee for suggesting this speciﬁcation.
9When we estimate equation (2), the results of AGHZ change dramatically and the coeﬃcient
of senators per capita becomes insigniﬁcant (column 2 of Table 3). However, the introduction
of state-speciﬁc trends is both very demanding and nevertheless insuﬃcient to isolate the eﬀect
of population dynamics, since other factors might be responsible for state speciﬁc trends in
spending.
Hence, to remove the eﬀect of pure population dynamics from the coeﬃcient of senators
per capita (which otherwise incorporates both the scale and the change eﬀects), an alternative
strategy consists of estimating an equation without state-speciﬁc trends but containing instead
our scale independent state index of population change (POPIND), i.e.
FEDEXP st = γSPst + ψPOPIND st + θZst + αs + βt + ²st,
s =1 ,...S; t =1 ,...,T; (3)
The results reported in column 3 of Table 3 show that the scale independent measure of
population change is key to explain federal budget allocation to the states. The coeﬃcient
of POPIND is negative and signiﬁcant, implying that fast growing states are penalized in
the allocation of the federal budget, independently of their size.20 On the other hand, once
we control for the scale independent population change, the coeﬃcient of senators per capita
becomes again insigniﬁcant (and its magnitude is reduced to about one third of the value
estimated in column (1) of table 3).
The result on senators per capita obtained introducing POPIND mirror quite well that
obtained using the state speciﬁc trends, suggesting that those trends may, to a large extent, be
linked to state-speciﬁc population dynamics. However, since state speciﬁc trends in spending
can be driven by other factors,21 as a further robustness check we run a regression where we
introduce both the state speciﬁct r e n d sa n dPOPIND (Table 3, column (4)). Once again,
senators per capita is not signiﬁcant, while the eﬀect of POPIND is reinforced.
This analysis leads to some important conclusions. First, states whose population grows
faster are penalized in the budget allocation independently of whether they are large (and
20As a further robustness check, we also introduced an interaction term between senators percapita and the
population index. This term should capture the possibility that small and large states have diﬀerent bargaining
power when they need to renegotiate their budgetary allocations due to their growing population. In turns out
that this interaction term, as well as senators percapita, do not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on spending, while
the population index coeﬃcient remains negative and signiﬁcant.
21The inﬂuence that individual states can exert on federal programs may well explain the state-speciﬁcity
of these trends. Individual states enjoy substantial discretion in promoting outreach or restricting access to
welfare programs such as, for example, health care, unemployment beneﬁts or education. For example, on
medicaid, states have discretion in increasing access to other groups besides the ones automatically eligible and
in excluding some types of immigrants.
10hence under-represented in the Senate) or small (and hence over-represented): this suggests
that the budget fails to respond to population changes at an adequate pace. Second, senators
per capita is not a statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variable when change and scale eﬀects
are separated. Conﬂating these two eﬀects leads to a serious overestimation of the scale eﬀect
and, therefore, of the upper bound of the potential impact of over-representation. Finally, the
impact of POPINDon spending is of a realistic magnitude, unlike the implied size of senators
per capita in the AGHZ speciﬁcation. For example, the estimates of Table 3 (column 3) imply
that, if in 1990 California had the same POPIND of Wyoming (106.7) then, everything else
being equal, California would receive $174 per capita more than what predicted by using its
actual POPIND (134.2). This represents less than 5% of the actual California’s per capita
spending in 1990. In Table 5 we report the average gains and losses (in 1983 USD) implied by
our estimates of the change eﬀect reported in column (3) of Table 3. These have been computed
by comparing, for each state, the predicted federal spending per capita implied by the average
POPIND in the state during the period 1978-2002, with the federal spending per capita that
the state would receive if its POPIND was equal to the US average during the same period.
The most penalized state, Nevada, is the fastest growing state. Its average per capita loss
per year is around 500 USD, or about 18% of its average budget. With the exception of very
few states, however, most gains and losses are contained within 4% of the yearly average state
budget. Moreover, gains and losses are not related to the population size of the states.
4 Disaggregated spending
Our analysis reveals that population dynamics play a crucial role in explaining the allocation of
the federal budget to the States and that, while large states do not get disproportionately less
spending than small ones, fast growing states receive signiﬁcantly less than shrinking ones. Fur-
ther insights can be obtained by analyzing disaggregated spending categories, since population
dynamics is likely to play a diﬀerent role in the various programs. We turn therefore to a brief
analysis of speciﬁc spending aggregates by using the two sub-categories analyzed by AGHZ,
i.e. direct payments to individuals and defense spending, plus the other sub-categories avail-
able from the statistical abstract of the United States, i.e. grants, salaries and procurements
spending.
For some spending categories, such as defense, there is no reason to expect that population
growth should play any particular role. For formula programs, such as grants — where population
is an important input — fast growing states are typically penalized by formulas that impose
restrictions on yearly funding changes, as well as by the use of outdated population data. The
11same can be said of salaries if spending in personnel to provide public goods and services does
not grow at the same pace as the overall population growth. Direct payments to individuals
could also be aﬀected by diﬀerent population dynamics as long as population growth may
disproportionately concern individuals not qualifying as recipients. For example, since states
with an above average population growth tend to have a much slower growth in their share of
individuals aged above 65,22 then fast growing states would be penalized in the allocation of
entitlements per capita consisting for a substantial part of retirement spending.23
We ﬁrst estimated the basic speciﬁcation reported in equation (1) using the various aggre-
g a t e sa sd e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e s( T a b l e6 ) . T h ec o e ﬃcient of senators per capita is positive in
all the equations but it is statistically signiﬁcant only in the case of direct payments to indi-
viduals, salaries and grants. It is instead insigniﬁcant in the case of defense and procurement
spending, that are at least as likely to be subject to political pressures. Contrary to AGHZ,
we ﬁnd that the largest coeﬃcient of senators per capita is obtained for direct payments to
individuals: this result is particularly puzzling since it is diﬃcult to explain why the number
of senators per capita should have such an important eﬀect on spending items that are hardly
targetable or politically manipulable. Similarly to Hoover and Pecorino (2005) we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcient of over-representation in the procurement equation is positive and signiﬁcant. This
result, however, is not robust to clustering the standard errors at the state level.
Hence, we add ﬁrst state speciﬁct r e n d s 24 and then POPIND to the basic speciﬁcation.
The results are reported in Tables 7a and 7b, columns (1)-(5). For grants, direct payments
to individuals, salaries and procurement, when we introduce either state-speciﬁct r e n d so r
POPIND, the coeﬃcient of senators per capita becomes insigniﬁcant. Senators per capita
displays a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on defense spending in one speciﬁcation (table 7a,
column 3). This eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant but quite small in size: one standard deviation
in senators per capita generates an extra transfer of approximately 72 USD per capita. This
22Nevada, for example, has a total population in 2002 which is three times its population in 1978, while its
population above 65 is only 1.22 times the 1978 ﬁgure.
23Moreover, since entitlements include several important types of welfare beneﬁts paid to persons, other
disproportionate changes in the share of non-recipients may decrease the amount transferred percapita at the
state level. For example, one of the most important welfare beneﬁts is the the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program. The resources devoted to this program declined in real terms from the late 1960s
through the 1990s. The Food Stamp and Medicaid programs grew in the early 70s causing the sum of these
two and the AFDC to rise, but declining then in real terms after the mid-1970s. There is weak evidence
that the decline of these programs is justiﬁed by the introduction of other substitutes (Moﬃtt (1990); Ribar
and Wilhelm (1994)) and one explanation is that the decline in participation rates may play an important
role (Moﬃtt (2003)). The analysis of participation rates and population dynamics for more speciﬁc spending
programs goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it could be an interesting avenue for future research.
24Similarly to total federal spending, all the aggregates display signiﬁcant state speciﬁct r e n d s .
12result is nevertheless coherent with the fact that defense spending, unlike direct payments to
individuals and salaries, is among the most “manipulable” spending categories and, therefore,
i ti sw h e r ei ts h o u l db em o r el i k e l yt oﬁnd the eﬀects of over-representation. Even in this
case, however, the interpretation of the small state advantage remains ambiguous since the
coeﬃcient of senators per capita can capture the eﬀect of over-representation together with
other scale eﬀects. Concerning POPIND - as we can see in table 7b - the index has a negative
and signiﬁcant impact on direct payments to individuals, grants and salaries. On the other
hand, as one would expect, population dynamics do not play any signiﬁcant role in the defense
and procurement regressions.25
Concluding this section, the patter n st h a tc a nb ef o u n di nm o r es p e c i ﬁc aggregates are
overall consistent with the results obtained analyzing total federal spending. The impact of
senators per capita appears to be stronger in less manipulable spending aggregates such as
direct payments to individuals. However, when we introduce state speciﬁc trends, or a scale
invariant population index, the eﬀect disappears for all spending aggregates. The only exception
is defense spending, where in fact there is no reason to expect a particularly important role
for population dynamics. The impact of senators per capita on defense spending, even when is
statistically signiﬁcant, is quite small in size.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Our analysis shows that the emphasis usually given to the impact of Congress malapportionment
on the distribution of the federal pie is exaggerated. The prevailing methodology inspired by
the work of Atlas et al. (1995) suﬀers from fundamental identiﬁcation problems and grossly
overestimates the role of over-representation. In particular, using senators per capita as the
main explanatory variable in spending regressions does not allow to isolate the role of small state
advantage (scale eﬀects like malapportionment or economies of scale) from that of population
growth (change eﬀect for a given population size). The reason is that, since there is no state
variation in the number of senators, the explanatory variable is simply a monotonic function
of population. Moreover any small state advantage found using this variable can be due to a
number of factors (related to the population of a state) other than malapportionment. When
25If we introduce both the state speciﬁc trends and the scale invariant population index, the coeﬃcient
of senators per capita remains insigniﬁcant in all cases with the exception of the defense equation, where the
coeﬃcient of senators percapita is again positive and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of POPIND is not signiﬁcant for
grants and salaries, whereas it is signiﬁcant in the regressions of direct payments to individuals and procurement
suggesting that other state speciﬁc trends not related to population dynamics may be at work. The results are
available from the authors upon request.
13c o n t r o l l i n gf o rt h ec h a n g ee ﬀect, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of senators per capita is never
signiﬁcant except, occasionally, for defense spending. Even in this case, the implied magnitudes
are extremely modest and the scale eﬀect captured by senators per capita is still only an upper
bound of the potential malapportionment eﬀect on defense.
Our analysis reveals that fast growing states are disadvantaged in the allocation of the federal
budget independently of their size. This may in part be due to the diﬃculties of collecting
and processing all the information necessary to guarantee to every state a fair share of the
budget. However, even when such information is available, budgetary rules and formulas, whose
determination is not isolated from the political process, can prevent fair reallocations of the
budget. The recent reform of Title I education programs provides an emblematic example. To
meet the increased education needs of fast growing states, decennial census data on population
have been replaced by biennial census estimates. At the same time, senators of shrinking
and slow growing states have managed to obtain the implementation of a 100% “hold harmless
provision” that, in the absence of any signiﬁcant increase in annual appropriations, has de facto
neutralized the use of updated data, preventing the reallocation of funds toward more needy
states. This shows how Congressmen are actively engaged in bargaining over the federal budget
allocation to bring bacon home, and how rapid shifts in population can create an important
divide between the interests of fast growing as opposed to shrinking or slow growing states.
The redistributive eﬀects associated with large population shifts open an important avenue
for future research on the allocation of the federal budget to the states. Understanding how
budgetary provisions for speciﬁc items are negotiated within Congress when large population
changes occur, and whether they are aﬀected by institutional and political features, such as
committee representation, party politics and electoral considerations, are very fundamental
questions that we leave for further investigation.
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Federal spending per 
capita (real 1983 
thousands USD)
WY 0.480 10.844 1.205 3144
VT 0.558 9.305 1.034 2726
ND 0.651 7.995 0.888 3807
DE 0.677 7.692 0.855 2731
SD 0.715 7.254 0.956 3329
MT 0.836 6.210 1.097 3340
RI 0.993 5.227 1.162 3297
ID 1.080 4.838 1.075 2862
NH 1.082 4.820 1.071 2673
ME 1.204 4.310 0.958 3212
NV 1.302 4.376 0.839 2810
NM 1.553 3.364 1.041 4437
NE 1.618 3.207 1.069 2969
UT 1.812 2.904 0.896 2738
WV 1.851 2.815 1.113 3020
AR 2.419 2.146 0.954 2856
KS 2.511 2.066 1.053 3093
MS 2.639 1.966 1.092 3249
IA 2.856 1.820 1.126 2736
OR 2.942 1.772 0.945 2635
OK 3.235 1.605 1.070 2975
CT 3.260 1.592 1.061 3632
CO 3.499 1.499 0.963 3170
SC 3.523 1.477 0.985 2897
KY 3.781 1.372 1.004 2910
AZ 3.805 1.418 0.802 3046
AL 4.121 1.259 0.979 3227
LA 4.323 1.201 1.011 2873
MN 4.439 1.170 1.040 2617
MD 4.757 1.093 0.972 4447
WA 4.945 1.060 0.961 3383
WI 4.977 1.043 1.043 2375
TN 5.017 1.036 1.013 3080
MO 5.194 0.999 1.020 3721
IN 5.671 0.915 1.036 2440
MA 6.014 0.863 1.032 3664
VA 6.199 0.840 0.970 4595
GA 6.663 0.789 0.909 2795
NC 6.803 0.767 0.971 2504
NJ 7.826 0.663 1.015 2793
MI 9.447 0.549 1.059 2444
OH 10.978 0.473 1.078 2652
IL 11.711 0.443 1.060 2561
PA 11.978 0.433 1.084 3054
FL 12.854 0.412 0.893 3160
TX 17.447 0.300 0.917 2695
NY 18.125 0.286 1.071 3104
CA 29.102 0.180 0.944 3176Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Population overall 5.20    5.48         0.43    35.12    N =    1200
between 5.47         0.48    29.10    n =      48
within 0.81         1.60 -   11.21    T =      25
Senate overrepresentation overall 0.97    0.99         0.06    4.71      N =    1200
between 1.00         0.07    4.18      n =      48
within 0.13         0.16    2.25      T =      25
House overrepresentation overall 1.76    0.24         0.92    2.90      N =    1200
between 0.14         1.42    2.09      n =      48
within 0.20         0.96    3.03      T =      25
Federal Spending overall 3.08    0.61         1.79    5.68      N =    1200
between 0.50         2.37    4.60      n =      48
within 0.35         1.53    4.91      T =      25
Direct Payments to individuals overall 1.58    0.33         0.80    3.53      N =    1200
between 0.18         1.12    2.07      n =      48
within 0.28         0.73    3.45      T =      25
Grants overall 0.52    0.17         0.23    1.39      N =    1200
between 0.12         0.34    0.95      n =      48
within 0.12         0.26    1.04      T =      25
Salaries overall 0.41    0.19         0.08    1.38      N =    1008
between 0.19         0.17    1.22      n =      48
within 0.05         0.06    0.57      T =      21
Procurements overall 0.48    0.36         0.09    2.34      N =    1008
between 0.33         0.15    1.58      n =      48
within 0.16         0.16 -   1.58      T =      21
Defense overall 0.54    0.36         0.06    2.51      N =    1200
between 0.34         0.11    1.99      n =      48
within 0.15       0.19 - 1.33    T =      25
All spending variables are expressed in real (1983) USD per capitaTable 3: OLS regressions with real federal outlays per capita as dependent variable (1978-2002) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable federal exp. federal exp. federal exp. federal exp.
senators per capita 0.6984 0.0575 0.2311 0.0705
(5.64)*** (0.28) (1.38) (0.27)
population index (POPIND) -0.0063 -0.0094
(3.66)*** (2.07)**
income -0.0685 -0.0041 -0.0757 0.0095
(1.99)* (0.14) (2.25)** (0.36)
unemployment -0.0004 0.0043 -0.0002 0.0065
(0.03) (0.46) (0.01) (0.72)
% aged above 65 13.5065 13.2514 10.3704 8.2209
(3.92)*** (4.08)*** (3.00)*** (2.07)**
% in schooling age (5-17) -9.4217 -3.6479 -8.6169 -3.4728
(3.35)*** (1.21) (3.43)*** (1.24)
Constant yes yes yes yes
State specific trends no yes no yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200
Overall R-squared 0.9126 0.9450 0.9196 0.9460
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 4: Federal outlays (real per capita) and  State Trends 1978-2002.








(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
AL 0.060 (16.16)*** -0.98 NC 0.046 (14.38)*** -0.99
AR 0.045 (11.29)*** -0.96 ND 0.076 (5.55)*** 0.62
AZ 0.018 (4.25)*** -0.98 NE 0.030 (3.88)*** -0.87
CA -0.007 (1.85)* -0.97 NH 0.007 (1.67) -0.97
CO 0.016 (2.14)** -0.98 NJ 0.037 (9.57)*** -0.98
CT -0.009 (1.54) -0.95 NM 0.036 (5.61)*** -0.98
DE 0.024 (7.84)*** -0.99 NV -0.017 (2.96)*** -0.98
FL 0.029 (8.86)*** -0.97 NY 0.032 (7.77)*** -0.9
GA 0.025 (4.22)*** -0.99 OH 0.039 (13.11)*** -0.94
IA 0.053 (8.30)*** -0.02 OK 0.050 (9.61)*** -0.82
ID 0.027 (4.14)*** -0.97 OR 0.027 (6.17)*** -0.98
IL 0.030 (6.26)*** -0.92 PA 0.052 (15.05)*** -0.9
IN 0.039 (13.05)*** -0.94 RI 0.049 (12.74)*** -0.95
KS 0.019 (3.51)*** -0.99 SC 0.043 (14.14)*** -0.98
KY 0.061 (10.50)*** -0.94 SD 0.058 (7.47)*** -0.94
LA 0.057 (11.62)*** -0.67 TN 0.033 (5.49)*** -0.98
MA 0.029 (5.07)*** -0.95 TX 0.025 (5.85)*** -0.97
MD 0.055 (12.22)*** -0.99 UT -0.003 (0.66) -0.98
ME 0.049 (8.13)*** -0.97 VA 0.064 (10.37)*** -0.99
MI 0.036 (11.59)*** -0.9 VT 0.042 (7.70)*** -0.99
MN 0.017 (4.37)*** -0.99 WA -0.002 (0.48) -0.99
MO 0.017 (2.70)** -0.98 WI 0.033 (12.12)*** -0.97
MS 0.045 (7.21)*** -0.94 WV 0.079 (16.00)*** 0.74
MT 0.061 (8.92)*** -0.92 WY 0.051 (6.56)*** -0.38
Column 2a and 2b report the t-statistics of the coefficient. Columns 3a and 3b report the correlation coefficient by state 
between senatorsPC and the trend variable.
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 Notes:  In columns 1a and 1b we report the trend coefficient of the trend state regressions.  Table 5: Average federal spending per capita and population index: 1978-2002
State population   average  average predicted   predicted  predicted 
 index population spending  difference: difference: difference:
(average) (millions)  per capita  (real 
1983 USD)
per capita (real 
1983 USD)
1




NV 195.43 1.22 2810 -505 -616 -17.98
AZ 160.35 3.68 3046 -284 -1044 -9.32
FL 148.41 13.02 3160 -208 -2713 -6.60
UT 137.65 1.73 2738 -140 -243 -5.13
TX 133.18 17.04 2695 -112 -1914 -4.17
GA 131.28 6.51 2795 -100 -653 -3.59
CA 130.50 29.93 3176 -95 -2854 -3.00
WA 130.38 4.90 3383 -95 -464 -2.80
CO 129.32 3.30 3170 -88 -290 -2.77
NM 127.85 1.52 4437 -79 -119 -1.77
NH 124.50 1.11 2673 -57 -64 -2.15
ID 122.48 1.01 2862 -45 -45 -1.56
NC 122.11 6.66 2504 -42 -282 -1.69
SC 121.41 3.50 2897 -38 -133 -1.31
OR 119.97 2.86 2635 -29 -83 -1.10
VA 119.73 6.21 4595 -27 -170 -0.60
DE 115.99 0.67 2731 -4 -3 -0.14
TN 115.79 4.89 3080 -3 -12 -0.08
MD 114.68 4.80 4447 4 21 0.10
VT 114.60 0.56 2726 5 3 0.18
OK 113.84 3.15 2975 10 31 0.33
WY 112.84 0.45 3144 16 7 0.51
AR 111.63 2.35 2856 24 56 0.83
AL 110.55 4.05 3227 31 124 0.95
MN 110.32 4.39 2617 32 140 1.22
ME 110.28 1.23 3212 32 40 1.00
MS 109.98 2.58 3249 34 88 1.05
LA 108.46 4.22 2873 44 185 1.52
KY 108.35 3.69 2910 44 164 1.53
MO 107.17 5.13 3721 52 266 1.39
MT 107.16 0.80 3340 52 42 1.55
KS 106.99 2.48 3093 53 131 1.71
NJ 106.99 7.76 2793 53 411 1.90
RI 106.53 1.00 3297 56 56 1.70
WI 106.28 4.90 2375 58 282 2.42
IN 105.29 5.56 2440 64 354 2.61
CT 104.61 3.29 3632 68 224 1.87
IL 104.56 11.45 2561 68 782 2.67
MA 104.22 6.02 3664 71 424 1.92
SD 103.68 0.70 3329 74 51 2.22
NE 103.15 1.58 2969 77 122 2.60
MI 102.90 9.31 2444 79 734 3.23
OH 102.59 10.86 2652 81 877 3.05
NY 102.40 18.00 3104 82 1476 2.64
PA 101.51 11.90 3054 88 1042 2.87
ND 99.71 0.64 3807 99 63 2.60
WV 99.47 1.79 3020 100 180 3.33
IA 98.28 2.78 2736 108 300 3.95
the average US population index from the average state spending  per capita predicted using the state average population 
index during the period 1978-2002. 
(1) The Average predicted difference is obtained by substracting the average state spending per capita predicted using Table 6: OLS regressions with aggregates from the Statistical Abstract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Direct payments Grants Salaries Procurement Defense
senators per capita 0.3221 0.1721 0.1091 0.1832 0.0226
(3.56)*** (3.97)*** (2.57)** (1.47) (0.38)
income -0.0259 -0.0055 0.0032 -0.0608 -0.0560
(2.13)** (0.76) (0.58) (1.46) (1.74)*
unemployment 0.0114 0.0077 -0.0007 -0.0163 -0.0206
(2.04)** (2.70)*** (0.24) (1.29) (1.98)*
% aged above 65 7.7769 3.2110 0.2453 2.2666 1.0835
(2.92)*** (3.92)*** (0.22) (0.56) (0.35)
% in schooling age (5-17) -3.0887 -1.0248 -0.4271 -4.2245 -3.7114
(2.60)** (1.89)* (0.58) (2.23)** (2.57)**
Constant yes yes yes yes yes
State Specific trends no no no no no
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1200 1200 1008 1008 1200
R-squared 0.9035 0.9195 0.9602 0.8631 0.8922
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 7a: OLS regressions with disaggregated spending and state specific trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Direct payments Grants Salaries Procurement Defense
Senators per capita -0.1068 -0.0951 0.0687 0.0236 0.2004
(1.00) (1.40) (1.55) (0.10) (2.20)**
Other controls
1 yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes
State Specific trends yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1200 1200 1008 1008 1200
R-squared 0.9565 0.9534 0.9863 0.9309 0.9439
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
0ther controls: income, unemployment, % aged (above 65), % in schooling age (5-17)
Table 7b: OLS regressions with  disaggregated spending without state specific trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Direct payments Grants Salaries Procurement Defense
Senators per capita 0.0298 0.0497 -0.0291 0.0421 0.0546
(0.30) (0.94) (0.42) (0.27) (0.46)
Population index -0.0039 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0017 0.0004
(3.34)*** (3.40)*** (2.59)** (1.23) (0.40)
Other controls
1 yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1200 1200 1008 1008 1200
R-squared 0.9128 0.9255 0.9639 0.8642 0.8923
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
0ther controls: income, unemployment, % aged (above 65), % in schooling age (5-17)Material for the Referee: regressions including both POPIND and state-specific trends 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Variable Direct payments Grants Salaries Procurement Defense
senators per capita -0.1020 -0.0941 0.0672 0.0459 0.2054
(0.89) (1.23) (1.65) (0.14) (2.20)**
population index -0.0035 -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0081 -0.0036
(1.73)* (0.65) (0.61) (2.22)** (1.33)
income -0.0139 -0.0077 0.0069 0.0249 0.0397
(0.86) (1.21) (1.06) (1.28) (2.22)**
unemployment 0.0091 0.0027 0.0030 -0.0036 -0.0089
(2.26)** (1.43) (1.79)* (0.52) (1.58)
% aged above 65 5.0530 2.3514 -0.0085 -1.1773 -2.0704
(2.23)** (1.89)* (0.01) (0.25) (0.68)
% in schooling age (5-17) -2.7728 -0.6271 0.1649 2.8521 0.4801
(1.62) (0.89) (0.41) (1.38) (0.42)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes
State Specific trends yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1200 1200 1008 1008 1200
R-squared 0.9569 0.9535 0.9864 0.9322 0.9443
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%